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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES








13 in July 2003, converted the case to Chapter 11 inAugust 2003 and 
converted the case to Chapter 7 in April 2004. In all three cases, the 
debtors	listed	a	residence	but	did	not	file	for	a	homestead	exemption	
for the residence. In July 2005, the court approved a motion by the 
trustee to sell all non-exempt assets, including property which was 
the	subject	of	this	case.	In	September	2005,	the	debtors	filed	for	a	
homestead exemption in real property which had been used by the 
debtors	as	offices	for	the	debtors’	various	businesses	and	never	as	a	 
residence. The court held that the property was not eligible for the 
homestead exemption because it was not the principal residence 
of the debtors and the property was no longer in the bankruptcy 
state because it was sold with the other non-exempt property. In 
re Wilson, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. W.D. ky. 2006). 
FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE. The debtor failed to pay taxes in the 1970s and 
the IRS made an assessment in 1980 for those taxes. During the 
next 25 years the debtor transferred property to relatives, used a 
wholly-owned corporation to pay personal expenses, used only 
cash transactions for receiving and paying money, owned several 
expensive cars and continued to resist making any payments on 
the back taxes. The court held that all this activity demonstrated 
that the debtor willfully attempted to evade payment of the taxes; 
therefore, the taxes were nondischargeable. In re klayman, 333 
B.R. 695 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2005). 
FEDERAL AGRICuLTuRAL 
PROGRAMS 
BLACk STEM RuST. The APHIS has adopted as final 
regulations which amend the black stem rust quarantine regulations 
by changing the movement restrictions in order to allow clonally 
propagated offspring of rust-resistant Berberis cultivars to move 
into or through a protected area without completing the currently 
required two-year growth period. The proposed regulations also 
add 13 varieties to the list of rust-resistant Berberis species. 71 
Fed. Reg. 5777 (Feb. 3, 2006). 
CONSERVATION SECuRITy PROGRAM. The NRCS has 
announced the CSP-06-01 sign-up that will be open from February 
13, 2006, through March 31, 2006, in selected 8-digit watersheds 
in all 50 states, Guam, and the Caribbean, which can be viewed 
at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/csp/2006_CSP_WS/index.
html. These watersheds were selected using the process set forth in 
the regulaitons. In addition to other data sources, this process used 
National Resources Inventory data to assess land use, agricultural 
input intensity, and historic conservation stewardship in watersheds 
nationwide. NRCS State Conservationists recommended a list of 
potential watersheds after gaining advice from the State Technical 
Committees. The Secretary of Agriculture announced on August 
25, 2005, the preliminary list of FY 2006 watersheds based on the 
President’s budget. Of those 110 watersheds, CSP will be offered 
in 60 watersheds nationwide based on available funding. The sign-
up will only include those producers who are not participants in an 
existing CSP contract. Applicants can submit only one application 
for this sign-up. 71 Fed. Reg. 6250 (Feb. 7, 2006). 
To be eligible for CSP, a majority of the agricultural operation must 
be within the limits of one of the selected watersheds. Applications 
which meet the minimum requirements as set forth in the Interim
Final Rule (listed below) will be placed in enrollment categories 
for funding consideration. Categories will be funded in alphabetical 
order until funds are exhausted. If funds are not available to fund an 
entire category, then the applications will fall into subcategories and 
funded in order until funds are exhausted. If a subcategory cannot be 
fully funded, applicants will be offered the FY 2006 CSP contract 
payment on a prorated basis. 
CROPINSuRANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed regulations 
which add provisions for mint crop insurance to the common crop 
insurance basic provisions. The proposed regulations make the pilot 
mint crop insurance program permanent. 71 Fed. Reg. 6016 (Feb. 
6, 2006), adding 7 C.F.R. § 457.169. 
MEAT INSPECTION. The FSIS has issued interim regulations 
amending the federal meat inspection regulations to provide 
for a voluntary fee-for-service program under which official 
establishments that slaughter horses will be able to apply for and pay 
for	ante-mortem	inspection.	The	fiscal	year	2006	Appropriations	Act	
prohibits the use of appropriated funds to pay the salaries or expenses 
of FSIS personnel to conduct ante-mortem inspection of horses. The 
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on the 
FY 2006 appropriations bill for Agriculture, Rural Development, 
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, however, 
provides that the Department of Agriculture is obliged to provide 
for inspection of meat for human consumption. FSIS is establishing 
this fee-for-service program under the Agricultural Marketing Act. 
Post-mortem inspection and other inspection activities authorized 
by	the	Federal	Meat	Inspection	Act	at	official	establishments	that	
slaughter horses would continue to be paid for with appropriated 
funds, except for overtime or holiday inspection services. 71 Fed. 
Reg. 6337 (Feb. 8, 2006). 
SuGAR. Prior to 1996, the interest rate on CCC sugar loans was 
set by the CCC by regulation. From 1996 to 2002, the interest rate 
on CCC loans to sugar producers was set by statute and equaled 
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the interest rate on other CCC agricultural commodity loans. 
Under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. 
L.	No.	107-171,	§	1401(c)(2),			116	Stat.	187	(2002)	(codified	at	
7 U.S.C. § 7283(b))		sugar	was	removed	from	the	definition	of	
agricultural commodity for purposes of the interest rate on CCC 
loans. However, the CCC decided to maintain the sugar loan 
interest rate equal to the interest rate for other commodities. 7 
C.F.R. § 1405.1. The plaintiffs, sugar processors, sued to require 
the CCC to return the interest rate to pre-1996 legislation levels. 
The court reviewed the statutory history of the 2002 change which 
indicated that Congress believed that the provision would decrease 
the interest rate on sugar loans. However, the court held that the 
2002 change merely reverted the authority to set the interest rate
back	to	the	CCC	without	any	specification	of	the	interest	rate	to	
be charged. The court also held that the CCC had the authority to 
set the interest rate above the cost of funds. Holly Sugar Corp. v. 
Veneman, 2006 u.S. App. LEXIS 2894 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’g, 
355 F. Supp.2d 181 (D. D.C. 2005). 
TuBERCuLOSIS. TheAPHIS has issued an interim regulation 
amending the bovine tuberculosis regulations by removing 
Minnesota from the list of accredited-free states and adding the 
state	to	the	list	of	modified	accredited	advanced	states.		71 Fed. 
Reg. 4808 (Jan. 30, 2006). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
EXECuTOR LIABILITy. The taxpayers were co-executors 
of a parent’s estate. Under the taxpayer’s direction, the estate paid 
state and local taxes and other debts but did not pay all federal 
taxes even though the IRS had sent them a letter stating the 
federal taxes had priority and had to be paid before other debts. 
When the taxpayer’s failed to make a compromise payment of 
the federal taxes, the taxpayers resigned as co-executors and a 
state administrator was appointed. The estate eventually paid a 
portion of the federal taxes after the taxpayers agreed to purchase 
a portion of the estate real property. The IRS sought payment of 
the remainder of the taxes and interest from the taxpayers. The 
court held that the taxpayers were liable for the federal taxes to 
the extent of the amount of other debts paid by the estate while the 
taxpayers were co-executors, but not for any additional interest. 
Irby v. united States, 2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,143 
(S.D. Ala. 2005). 
CHARITABLE DEDuCTION. The decedent had created an 
inter vivos trust which became irrevocable upon the decedent’s 
death. The trust provided that, upon the decedent’s death, the trust 
principal was to be distributed to a trust for the decedent’s child. 
The trust also provided that, upon the death of the child, several 
properties held by the trust were to be sold, with the proceeds 
distributed to individuals and several charitable organizations. 
The decedent’s executor determined that the trust did not satisfy 
the requirements of a charitable remainder trust. The executor 
petitioned a state court to reform the trust into two trusts, a 
charitable trust and a non-charitable trust. The charitable trust 
received the proportional value of the assets which would pass to 
the charities. The charitable trust provided for an annuity for the 
child and charities of 5 percent of the initial fair market value of 
the trust assets, paid proportionally from the assets as provided 
in the original trust remainder. The IRS ruled that the trust 
reformation	qualified	the	present	value	of	the	charitable	interests	
for the estate tax charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 200605001, 
Oct. 21, 2005. 
DISCLAIMERS. The decedent died intestate with property 
in two states. Under the intestacy laws of the two states, some 
of the decedent’s estate passed to the decedent’s children and 
siblings. The children, or their legal representatives, and the 
siblings	filed	written	disclaimers	of	 their	 intestate	interests	 in	
the estate property such that the property would all pass to 
the surviving spouse. The IRS held that the disclaimers were 
effective	and	qualified	the	property	for	the	marital	deduction.	
Ltr. Rul. 200604003, Oct. 21, 2005. 
The decedent’s estate included an interest in a trust which 
passed to a family trust and a marital trust. The estate elected 
QTIP treatment of the marital trust. The surviving spouse 
executed	a	non-qualified	disclaimer	of	the	spouse’s	interest	in	
the marital trust, resulting in the trust assets passing to the family 
trust.	The	family	trust	beneficiaries	agreed	to	pay	any	gift	tax	
which might result from the spouse’s disclaimer. The IRS ruled 
that,	because	the	disclaimer	was	not	qualified,	the	passing	of	the	
spouse’s interest in the marital trust to the family trust resulted 
in a taxable gift. However, the IRS ruled that the amount of the 
gift was decreased by the amount of gift tax paid by the family 
trust	beneficiaries.	Ltr. Rul. 200604006, Sept. 30, 2005. 
POWER OFAPPOINTMENT. The taxpayer created a trust 
for	the	benefit	of	the	taxpayer	and	taxpayer’s	spouse	during	life.	
The trust provided that, if the taxpayer died before the spouse, 
the trust passed to the spouse. The trust also provided that, if the 
spouse predeceases the taxpayer, the spouse had a testamentary 
general power of appointment over assets equal in value to the 
spouse’s remaining applicable exclusion amount less the value 
of the spouse’s taxable estate determined as if the spouse did not 
possess this power. The IRS ruled that, if the spouse predeceases 
the taxpayer, the value of the trust assets over which the spouse 
holds a testamentary general power of appointment will be 
included in the spouse’s gross estate. Further, on the death of 
the spouse during the taxpayer’s lifetime, if the spouse exercises 
the testamentary general power of appointment conferred upon 
the spouse under the terms of the trust, the taxpayer is treated 
as relinquishing the taxpayer’s dominion and control over the 
property subject to that power of appointment. Accordingly, the 
IRS ruled that, on the death of the spouse during the taxpayer’s 
lifetime, if the spouse exercises the power of appointment granted 
to the spouse under the terms of the trust, the taxpayer will make 
a completed gift under I.R.C. § 2501. The gift will qualify for 
the federal gift tax marital deduction under I.R.C. § 2523. The 
spouse executed a last will and testament in which the spouse 
will exercise to the fullest extent possible the testamentary 
general power of appointment granted to the spouse under the 
trust. Under the terms of the spouse’s will, the spouse’s residuary 
estate will be added to a trust created by the spouse. If the spouse 
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predeceases the taxpayer and the spouse exercises the spouse’s 
testamentary general power of appointment to the fullest extent 
possible, the taxpayer will be treated as making a completed gift 
to the spouse of the appointed assets and the spouse will be treated 
as the owner of those assets. The assets of the trust appointed 
by the spouse will ultimately pass to the spouse’s trust pursuant 
to the terms of the spouse’s will. The IRS ruled that any assets 
that originated in the taxpayer’s trust and that are distributed 
to or from the spouse’s trust will not constitute gifts from the 
taxpayer	to	the	other	beneficiaries	of	the	spouse’s	trust.	Ltr. Rul. 
200604028, Sept. 30, 2005. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ALTERNATIVE MINIMuM TAX. The taxpayer was a 
corporation which had alternative minimum tax net operating 
losses in 1987 and thereafter. In an audit, the IRS carried these 
AMT NOLs back to 1986 and offset the NOLs against regular 
income. The taxpayer argued that this carryback was improper 
because the corporation did not have any AMT income in 1986 
because the AMT for corporations did not exist until after 1986. 
The taxpayer argued that theAMT was a parallel and separate tax 
system which prevented use of its tax items against tax items of 
the regular tax system. The court held that the AMT NOLs could 
be offset against regular income before 1986 because the AMT
was not a separate tax system. Sequa Corp. & Affilliates v. 
united States, 2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,146 (2d Cir. 
2006), aff’g, 350 F. Supp.2d 447 (S.D. N.y. 2004). 
CLEAN-BuRNING FuEL DEDuCTION. The IRS has 
announced	that	it	has	certified	the	2006	Toyota	Prius	Hybrid	as	
eligible for the clean-burning fuel deduction (up to $2,000 for 
2005) under I.R.C. § 179A as amended by Pub. L. No 108-311, 
the Working Families ReliefAct of 2004. The provision has been 
repealed for property placed in service after 2005 and replaced 
with a credit. IR-2006-26. 
COuRT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
filed	a	lawsuit	against	a	former	employer	seeking	compensatory	
and punitive damages for wrongful termination, discrimination 
and	 intentional	 infliction	 of	 emotional	 distress.	The	 taxpayer	
received an award after binding arbitration for back pay, front 
pay and emotional distress. No punitive damages were awarded. 
The award was paid in three annual installments to the taxpayer’s 
attorney who forwarded the payments, reduced by the legal 
fees, to the taxpayer. The taxpayer initially failed to report any 
of the award as income and made no claim for a deduction for 
the legal fees. After the IRS challenged the return, the taxpayer 
filed	an	amended	return	which	listed	the	award	on	Schedule	C	 
and included the legal fees as an expense. The court held that 
the award was not business income and that the legal fees were 
eligible only for the itemized miscellaneous deduction, subject 
to	the	2	percent	floor	and	to	alternative	minimum	tax.	kenton 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-13. 
DISABILITy PAyMENTS. The taxpayer received military 
and social security disability payments for lung cancer which 
resulted from exposure to Agent Orange during the taxpayer’s 
service in the Vietnam war. The taxpayer excluded the social 
security payments from income, arguing that they represented 
payments for personal injuries or sickness under I.R.C. § 104. 
The court held that the social security payments were subject to 
taxation under I.R.C. § 86 because the payments were based on the 
taxpayer’s prior earnings and not on the nature of the disability. In 
addition,	the	court	noted	that	social	security	benefits	are	paid	for	the	
beneficiary’s	inability	to	work	and	not	as	compensation	for	injury.	
Reimels v. Comm’r, 2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,147 (2d 
Cir. 2006), aff’g, 123 T.C. 245 (2004). 
DISASTER LOSSES. On January 11, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in Texas are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Disaster Relief and Emergency 
AssistanceAct (42 U.S.C. § 5121)	as	a	result	of	an	extreme	wildfire,	
which began on December 1, 2005. FEMA-1624-DR. Taxpayers 
who sustained losses attributable to the disaster may deduct the 
losses on their 2004 returns. 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers, husband 
and wife, had three credit cards with one credit card company. The 
taxpayers borrowed funds from another source and made a payment 
of $14,937 to satisfy a total balance of $20,645 on the credit cards. 
The credit card company issued a Form 1099-C reporting discharge 
of indebtedness income of $6,583. In the tax year involved, the 
taxpayers	were	not	insolvent	and	did	not	file	for	bankruptcy	but	
the taxpayers did not include the $6,583 in taxable income. The 
taxpayers argued that the instructions in the IRS guidance booklet 
for	filing	 a	 1099-C	 require	 that	 only	 the	 principal	 of	 a	 lending	
transaction be taken into income as discharge of indebtedness 
income; therefore, the taxpayer’s outstanding credit card liability, 
which included interest, operation charges, and penalties, was 
reduced pursuant to the instructions in the IRS guidance booklet. 
The pertinent instructions state, as follows: 
	 “Debt	Defined 
“A debt is any amount owed to you including stated principal, stated interest, 
fees,	penalties,	administrative	costs,	and	fines.	The	amount	of	debt	canceled	may	
be all or only part of the total amount owed. However, for a lending transaction, 





“2. Interest. You are not required to report interest. However, if you choose to 
report interest as part of the canceled debt in box 2 [of the 1099-C], you must 
show the interest separately in box 3.
“3. Nonprincipal amounts. For a lending transaction, you are not required to 
report any amount other than stated principal. A lending transaction occurs when 
a lender loans money to, or makes advances on behalf of, a borrower (including 
revolving	credit	and	lines	of	credit).	Nonprincipal	amounts	include	penalties,	fines,	
fees, and administrative costs. However, for a nonlending transaction, report any 
of these amounts that are included in the debt.” 
The court held that instructions to forms do not control over 
statutes and regulations or case precedent, all of which clearly 
hold that discharge of indebtedness income equals the difference 
between the total amount due and the amount paid to discharge 
the obligation. The court also held that, under these instructions, 
in nonlending situations such as credit cards, any nonprincipal 
amounts are included in the debt. Query: Are credit card accounts 
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nonlending transactions, at least between the credit card company 
and the debtor, or are they lending transactions like lines of 
credit or revolving credit mentioned in the instructions? Also, 
see Earnshaw v. Comm’r, 2005-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,566 
(10th Cir. 2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2002-191 (release of disputed 
finance	 charges	 and	 late	 charges	 did	 not	 create	 discharge	 of	
indebtedness income for those amounts). Interestingly, the court 
here cites Earnshaw for the rule that discharge of debt income 
equals the entire amount owed to the credit card company, even 
though the court in Earnshaw	excluded	the	disputed	finance	and	
late charges from discharge of indebtedness income. Scott v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-16. 
ELECTRICITy PRODuCTION CREDIT.Astate provided 
state tax credits for wind-powered electric generation facilities in 
the state. The taxpayer corporation constructed a wind-powered 
electric	generation	facility	which	qualified	for	the	I.R.C.	§	45(d)(1)	
electricity production credit and the state tax credit. The IRS 
ruled that, although the statute does refer to reduction for “other 
allowable credits,” the reduction applies only to federal credits 
and does not reduce the credit for any state law credits. Rev. Rul. 
2006-9, I.R.B. 2006-9. 
EMPLOyEE BENEFITS. If an employer provides an 
employee with a vehicle that is available to the employee for 
personal use, the value of the personal use must generally 
be included in the employee’s income and wages. I.R.C. § 
61; Treas. Reg. §1.61-21. For employer-provided passenger 
automobiles (including trucks and vans) made available to 
employees for personal use that meet the requirements of Treas. 
Reg. § 1.61-21(e)(1), generally the value of the personal use 
may be determined under the vehicle cents-per-mile valuation 
rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(e). However, Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
21(e)(1)(iii)(A)	provides	 that,	 for	a	passenger	automobile	first	
made available after 1988 to any employee of the employer for 
personal use, the value of the personal use may not be determined 
under the vehicle cents-per-mile valuation rule for a calendar year 
if the fair market value of the passenger automobile (determined 
pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(d)(5)(i) through (iv)) on the 
first	 date	 the	 passenger	 automobile	 is	 made	 available	 to	 the	
employee	exceeds	a	specified	dollar	limit.		For	employer-provided	
vehicles available to employees for personal use for an entire 
year, generally the value of the personal use may be determined 
under the automobile lease valuation rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
21(d). Under this valuation rule, the value of the personal use 
is the Annual Lease Value. Provided the requirements of Treas. 
Reg. § 1.61-21(d)(5)(v)	are	met,	an	employer	with	a	fleet	of	20	
or	more	automobiles	may	use	a	fleet-average	value	for	purposes	




made available after 1988 to an employee of the employer for 
personal use, the value of the personal use may not be determined 
under	the	fleet-average	valuation	rule	for	a	calendar	year	if	the	
fair market value of the automobile (determined pursuant to 
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(d)(5)(i)	through	(v))	on	the	first	date	the	
passenger automobile is made available to the employee exceeds 
a	specified	dollar	limit.	The	IRS	has	issued	a	revenue	procedure	 
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which provides: (1) the maximum value of employer-provided 
vehicles	 first	 made	 available	 to	 employees	 for	 personal	 use	 in	
calendar year 2006 for which the vehicle cents-per-mile valuation 
rule provided under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(e) may be applicable 
is $15,000 for a passenger automobile and $16,400 for a truck or 
van; and (2) the maximum value of employer-provided vehicles 
first	made	available	 to	employees	 for	personal	use	 in	calendar	
year	 2006	 for	 which	 the	 fleet-average	 valuation	 rule	 provided	
under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(d) may be applicable is $19,900 for 
a passenger automobile and $21,400 for a truck or van. Rev. Proc. 
2006-15, I.R.B. 2006-5, 387. 
HOBBy LOSSES. The taxpayer was a full time dentist who 
had purchased rural land for a residence. The taxpayer also used 
the residence for a horse breeding and training operation. The 





advertising, made few sales, and did not develop a business plan;
(3) the taxpayer did not make any changes to the operation which 
were	intended	to	improve	profitability;	(4)	although	the	taxpayer	
had experience with horses, the taxpayer did not have expertise 
with running a horse breeding operation and did not seek advice of 
other	experts;	(5)	although	the	taxpayer	spent	a	significant	amount	
of time on the operation, the amount of time did not exceed the 
time one would spend on a hobby; (6) the taxpayer had mostly 
years	of	losses	from	the	operation	and	significant	income	from	a	
dental practice which was offset by the losses; and (7) the taxpayer 
received substantial personal pleasure from the activity. Giles v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-15. 
HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer was a medical doctor employed 
by a Veteran’s Administration hospital. The taxpayer was also 
a licensed attorney but did not operate a practice at a separate 
location. The taxpayer also provided medical and legal services 
for indigent patients and clients. The taxpayer maintained a home 
office	for	the	indigent	services	but	all	of	the	clients	and	patients	
were	served	at	locations	outside	of	the	home	office.		The	taxpayer	
did not receive any income from the indigent services but claimed 
business	deductions	for	expenses	associated	with	the	home	office	
and other business expenses on Schedule C. The court held that 
the lack of any income demonstrated that the indigent activity was 
not a trade or business because of a lack of any intent to make 
a	profit.	 	Therefore,	 the	 related	expenses	could	not	be	claimed	
as business expenses and could be allowed only as Schedule A
personal deductions, if eligible. Lamb v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 
Op. 2006-13. 
INFORMATION RETuRNS.	The	IRS	has	adopted	as	final	
regulations relating to the designation of the person required 
to	 report	 the	 income	 earned	on	qualified	 settlement	 funds	 and	
certain other funds, trusts, and escrow accounts, and other related
rules.	The	proposed	regulations	would	affect	qualified	settlement	
funds,	qualified	escrow	accounts	and	qualified	trusts	established	
in connection with deferred like-kind exchanges, escrow accounts 
established in connection with sales of property, disputed 
ownership funds, and parties to these escrow accounts, trusts, and 
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funds. 71 Fed. Reg. 6197 (Feb. 7, 2006). 
LEGALEXPENSES. The taxpayer operated a dance studio and 
entered into oral contracts with dance instructors which treated the 
instructors as independent contractors for tax withholding purposes. 
An	IRS	field	examination	agent	concluded	that	the	instructors	were	
employees. The taxpayer appealed the determination to the IRS 
Appeals	Office	which	eventually	determined	that	the	case	should	
not be pursued by the IRS because the taxpayer had an 80 percent
chance of prevailing on the issue. The taxpayer sought recovery of 
legal costs. The court held that the taxpayer could recover some 
of the legal costs because the IRS agent failed to consider factors 
in	the	taxpayer’s	favor,	making	the	IRS	position	unjustified.			The	
court noted that (1) although the taxpayer had some involvement
with the instructors and provided a manual, the taxpayer did not 
attempt to control the way the classes were taught and the manual
was only a general guideline and suggestion for conducting classes 
and (2) although the taxpayer provided the major investment in 
the studio, the instructors also provided substantial investment in 
their training, music and dance costumes. Images in Motion of 
El Paso, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-19. 
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February 2006 for 
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. 
§ 412(c)(7), the 30-year Treasury securities rate for this period 
is 4.84 percent, the 90 percent to 105 percent permissible range 
is 4.35 percent to 5.08 percent, and the 90 percent to 110 percent
permissible range is 4.35 percent to 5.08 percent. The corporate 
bond weighted average is no longer relevant for plans beginning
after 2005. Notice 2006-19, I.R.B. 2006-9. 
RETuRNS. The IRS has posted the following publications 
to its website, www.irs.ustreas.gov, in the Forms & Pubs section:
Form 990-C (2005), Farmers’ Cooperative Association Income 
Tax Return; Form 1023 (Rev. October 2004), Application for 
Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue	Code;	Form	1041,	Schedule	K-1	(2005),	Beneficiary’s	
Share of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc.; Form 1120-RIC (2005), 
U.S. Income Tax Return for Regulated Investment Companies; 
Form 8911 (2005), Alternative Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property 
Credit; and Form 8903 (2005), Domestic Production Activities 
Deduction. [Note in particular the discussion in the instructions 
about pass-through entity calculations] 
SALE OF RESIDENCE. Although the ruling does not 
specifically	identify	the	nature	of	the	relationships,	the	taxpayer	
and spouse apparently moved in with the taxpayer’s parents and 
became joint tenants with the parents in owning the residence. 
Within two years, the parents moved to an assisted living facility
and the residence was sold. Because the taxpayers had owned 
an interest in and lived in the residence for less than two years, 
the taxpayer sought a partial exclusion of the gain from the sale. 
The IRS ruled that the reason for the sale of the residence, the 
poor	health	of	the	parents,	was	sufficient	to	qualify	the	sale	of	
the residence for the partial exclusion of gain under I.R.C. § 121 
based on the fraction of two years in which the taxpayer owned and 
resided in the residence. Ltr. Rul. 200604013, Oct. 18, 2005. 
PROPERTy 
CONVERSION. The plaintiff was a niece of the defendant. 
On a visit to the defendant’s farm, the plaintiff’s son expressed 
an interest in having a horse and rode one of the defendant’s 
older horses. The defendant offered to let the child have the 
horse for riding. The plaintiff constructed an area for a horse on 
the plaintiff’s property and offered to purchase the horse from 
the defendant. The defendant declined payment, saying that 
the ownership of the horse was a matter between the defendant 
and the child. Three years later, the defendant asked to have the 
horse returned because the child was no longer riding the horse. 
When the plaintiff refused to return the horse, the defendant 
entered onto the plaintiff’s property and retrieved the horse. 
The plaintiff sued for conversion, claiming that the horse was 
a gift. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling that no 
gift was intended by the defendant but that the horse was only 
loaned to the child for use in a 4-H project. The appellate court 
also upheld the trial court judgment awarding the plaintiff one 
dollar in damages for the trespass of the defendant in retrieving 
the horse, noting that the plaintiff had not proven any damages 
from the trespass. Stoeker v. Stephens, 2006 IowaApp. LEXIS 
51 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006). 
SECuRED TRANSACTIONS 
SALE OF COLLATERAL. The defendant had purchased 
a	livestock	supply	company	and	financed	the	business	through	
the plaintiff bank. The loan was secured by personal property 
used in the business and the defendant’s home. The defendant 
defaulted on the loan and the bank disposed of the business assets 
at private sale and sought foreclosure against the defendant’s 
home. The bank had sent notice of the personal property sale 
by	certified	regular	mail	but	the	defendant	refused	delivery	of	
the notice three times. The defendant challenged the foreclosure 
on the basis that the defendant did not receive notice of the sale 
of the personal property and that the sale was not conducted 
in a commercially reasonable manner because the sale was 
not advertised nationally. The court, upholding the trial court 
judgment for the bank, held that Iowa law focuses on the manner 
in which notice is sent, not whether the notice was actually 
received,	and	that	sending	notice	by	certified	mail	satisfied	the	
statutory notice requirement. The court also agreed that the 
sales were conducted in a commercially reasonable manner 
in advertising the sale only locally. The court noted that there 
was no certainty that a nationally advertised sale would have 
brought more than a local sale, and the bank would have incurred 
additional expense in doing so, resulting in little gain over the 
locally advertised sales. Panora State Bank v. Dickinson, No. 
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